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3Introduction 
We live in a world of passwords. We use them for everything: to access our e-mail and 
credit cards; to read content on LexisNexis and ESPN.com; to chat with our friends on America 
Online and Yahoo!. We have so many of them, it can be easy to forget which password belongs 
to which service. Because of their ubiquity, we also tend to reuse our passwords. The password 
to access my e-mail, for instance, is the same password I use to access LexisNexis. The ubiquity 
of passwords, however, has given rise to an entire criminal enterprise focused on acquiring them. 
Criminals reason, rightly so, that if they have acquired one password, they have access to much 
of what you do. Consequently, security experts have suggested for years that to increase security, 
computer users should vary their passwords frequently, and use different passwords for different 
services.1 Few take this advice. In a world built on access and information, the password has 
become the ultimate skeleton key. 
 While stealing passwords is not a new crime, in the world of Internet theft, it has taken on 
new dimensions. In general, identifying the victim of criminal behavior on the Internet has 
become increasingly difficult. Traditional notions of criminal deterrence—from both economic 
and sociological perspectives—have become skewed in a world where even the criminal does 
not necessarily know who he is criminalizing.2 The anonymous nature of the Internet, where the 
identity of criminals can be obscured, and the identity of the victims is often unknown even to 
 
1 See, e.g., Password Usage Guidelines, THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO COMPUTING AND NETWORK 
SERVICES, www.utoronto.ca/security/UTORprotect/passwd.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
 
2 See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POLIT. ECON. 69 (1968) 
(analyzing criminal behavior from an economic perspective); Michel Foucault, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1975) (a 
sociological perspective on criminal behavior). 
 
4the criminals, has elicited proposals from both scholars and law enforcement.3 The threat of 
stealing a password—a sequence of digits that may contain access to an individual’s entire life 
savings and private thoughts—has given these concerns a heightened sense of urgency. 
 In late 1999, the world got its first glimpse on a mass scale of the difficulties Internet 
crime poses. Napster, with access to millions of Internet users who had billions of directories 
containing countless amounts of copyrighted material, created the world’s largest marketplace 
for music theft. The astonishing feature of the Napster revolution, however, was not just its sheer 
size; it was the kind of people involved. College students, who otherwise would not shoplift a 
candy bar, engaged in widespread copyright theft, rationalizing their behavior on a variety of 
factors. While many griped about the expense of albums, the ease of access, or the effect of peer 
pressure, the fundamental issue was quite simple, if unstated: no one thought it was a crime. Put 
bluntly, copying your friend’s music files was widely considered victimless, harmless. 
 Five years later, there has been an astonishing turn around in the public perception of 
music downloading. According to a recent study, legal music downloading has tripled, while 
illegal downloading has grown at a far slower pace.4 A 2004 Pew survey showed that illegal 
music downloading is on the decline.5 Something has happened between 1999 and the present 
that has changed people's minds about music downloading. What was once an acceptable action, 
committed by almost every college and high school student with a high-speed Internet 
connection, is now viewed by millions as criminal.  
 
3 See generally, Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2001); 
Lawrence Lessig, CODE, 46-7 (1999). 
 
4 E-CommerceTimes.com, Study: Legal Music Downloading Triples Worldwide (2005), 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/44871.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
 
5 Techweb.com, Survey: Illegal Music Downloading Declines, http://www.techweb.com/wire/26803753 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
5Clearly a part of what happened in the Napster story is that people began to view the act 
of downloading music freely as illegal. A significant part of this was accomplished by shifting 
victimhood—instead of thinking of it as harmlessly taking the music from someone's computer, 
people began to think of music downloading as stealing directly from the record companies. By 
putting themselves out in front as the victims, the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) helped reshape the governing norms of the times, and as a result, people viewed the act 
of file-sharing differently. 6 By forcing people to see music downloading as a form of theft, the 
RIAA was quite successful in deterring it. In the process, they also proposed a radical view of 
theft that changes our basic economic understandings of the action.  
 The Napster story serves as a useful template for thinking about password theft. If Tom 
steals Mary's password to access her LexisNexis account, there are two possible victims: Mary 
and Lexis. At first glance, we would probably say Mary is the primary victim, but that is not 
altogether clear. After all, Tom would probably argue that Mary can still access LexisNexis even 
as he is using her password. And even if Lexis were to design their software so that each 
password can only log on once, depriving Tom and Mary of simultaneous use, Tom is likely to 
argue that he is not really harming Mary because he is only depriving her of the short period of 
usage when he is online: the deprivation is not permanent. This problem is further complicated if 
rather than stealing her Lexis password, Tom borrows it from Mary with her permission. In this 
case, Mary is no longer a victim, she is a co-conspirator, and the real victim has become even 
further obscured. If we think of LexisNexis as the victim in both scenarios, however, the answer 
becomes clearer: in both cases Tom's actions were criminal, and Mary was his co-criminal in the 
second scenario.  
 
6 Cf. Katyal, supra note 3, at 1033 (arguing that harnessing third parties, like credit card companies, can 
make music theft less profitable and thereby deter it). 
6This paper argues that the RIAA's model for deterring music theft could be successfully 
used to deter many other forms of computer theft, and, specifically, stealing passwords. By 
focusing on the victim, content-providers can alter people’s views of their actions, thereby 
properly bringing what was once an innocuous activity into the realm of the criminal where it 
belongs. To accomplish this task, however, we have to comport our traditional views of theft to 
the realities of the Internet. First, economic notions of rivalry and nonrivalry are undermined in a 
digital world where data is infinitely copyable, and these notions need to be updated 
appropriately. Secondly, finding real space analogues to password theft is important in locating 
an existing legal framework with which to work. This Note attempts to do both.  
 Part I of this Note gives a brief background and explication of rivalrous and non-rivalrous 
theft, and the problems that the Internet poses, specifically in the music downloading area. In so 
doing, I propose a new way of conceiving of rivalry that fits into the realities of digital networks. 
Part II is an analysis of password theft, in particular the distinction between first-party and 
second-party password theft. First-party password theft concerns actions—stealing personal 
identification numbers and the like—that are probably familiar to most readers. Second-party 
password theft, however, is a far more radical notion that is crucial for understanding why 
password theft in general is criminal, and why it can be so damaging. I analogize first and 
second-party password theft to larceny and embezzlement, respectively; the purpose of this is to 
provide a legal framework for analyzing password theft as a criminal activity. Additionally, I 
show how the updated views of rivalry proposed in Part I allow us to evaluate properly the harm 
that password theft causes. Finally, Part III argues that by following the model of the RIAA, the 
government, content-providers, and law enforcement can effectively deter password theft in a 
variety of ways. 
7I. Rivalrous versus Non-Rivalrous Theft 
Economic theory distinguishes between two forms of theft: rivalrous and non-rivalrous.7
Rivalrous theft is traditionally understood as theft that deprives the victim of using whatever it is 
that was stolen. So if John steals Frank's car, the theft is rivalrous because John has taken the car 
and deprived Frank of its usage. Non-rivalrous theft is theft that does not deprive the victim of 
any usage. The classic example of non-rivalrous theft is information. If Tom tries to sell 
information, and Frank steals it, theoretically he is not depriving Tom of selling just as much 
information as before. The theft, in other words, causes no depletion.8 The two models of theft 
therefore reflect two forms of goods: those that deplete and those that do not.  
 Concordantly, theft that is not rivalrous, under the common law, is not theft.9 The 
traditional laws regarding theft always required some form of permanent deprivation, whether 
the theft was characterized as larceny or embezzlement.10 Unauthorized use of information is 
usually protected by copyright or intellectual property laws designed to encourage innovation 
 
7 For a general introduction, see generally David A. Besanko & Ronald R. Braeutigam, MICROECONOMICS 
749 (2002). 
 
8 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003) (“By contrast, a gene sequence, an MP3 file, or an image may be used by multiple 
parties; my use does not interfere with yours. To simplify a complicated analysis, this means that the threat of 
overuse of fields and fisheries is generally not a problem with the informational or innovational commons”); see 
also Robert P. Merges et. al., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHONOLOGICAL AGE, 13 (2d ed. 2000). 
 9 See, e.g., Kansas v. Allen, 917 P.2d 848, 853 (Kan. 1996) (“Theft...is not concerned with mere 
occupation, detention, observation, or tampering, but rather requires permanent deprivation. The intent required for 
theft is an 'intent to deprive the owner permanently of the possession, use, or benefit of the owner's property’”). 
 
10 William R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 19.2, 19.6 (4th ed. 2003). 
 
8while preventing usurpation of ideas and free-riding.11 So if Frank photocopies Tom’s book and  
attempts to sell it as his own, his actions are criminalized by copyright law, not the traditional 
laws of theft, because, theoretically at least, Tom has not been deprived of anything—he can sell 
just as many books as he had before. In contrast, if Frank walks into a bookstore and steals 
Tom’s book from the store, his theft has deprived the bookstore of a book it could have sold. 
Because the law recognized the important public good that information represented, goods that 
do not deplete with theft—like information—are not accorded the same level of protection as 
goods that do deplete with theft.  
 In a digital world, however, this dichotomy begins to find itself on shaky ground, as it 
becomes unclear who the law is supposed to protect. In real space, information can easily be 
protected by copyright law, because it is readily apparent whom we are protecting—the 
innovators, creators, and disseminators of that information. Digitization, however, has allowed 
information to be replicated and disseminated faster and wider than ever before. Buying and 
selling information is no longer prohibitively expensive, and copyright law has proven 
insufficient in protecting holders.12 Furthermore, on digital networks it is harder to determine 
who owns the copyright. In real space, when a consumer purchases a book or CD, the copyright 
owner’s mark is stamped on the product, and the consumer readily recognizes ownership of the 
copyright.13 The protection that the law accords to copyright material in this setting is therefore 
lower than that accorded to rivalrous goods. On the Internet, however, the copyright owner is not 
readily apparent; information appears as anonymous digital files that may not bear any mark or 
 
11 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 
(2005).  
 
12 See Katyal, supra note 3, at 1031-32. 
 
13 See Jane C. Ginsburg et. al., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 45 (3d ed. 2001). As 
Ginsburg points out, one purpose of trademark law is to aid in consumer identification. 
9distinguishing feature, and users have no easy way of determining who owns that particular file, 
let alone the copyright. The real space level of protection accorded to copyrighted material is not 
sufficient in this environment. 
 What actually happened in the Napster story was a profound shift in an understanding of 
rivalrous versus non-rivalrous theft. From a traditional standpoint, downloading music should be 
viewed as non-rivalrous theft—when Tom downloads music off of Frank’s computer, he never 
deprived Frank, or anyone, of listening to that song or purchasing that song. Theoretically, just as 
many songs could be purchased after the download. The trouble with this construction is that it 
views Frank as the victim, when in reality he is hardly a victim; if anything, by making his music 
available on his computer, Frank is an enabler.14 When Napster took off, this question of who the 
victim was had no apparent answer, and that in large part fueled Napster’s popularity: music 
downloading, because of its non-rivalrous nature, was viewed as a victimless crime. However, 
just because Frank is not the victim, it does not mean there is no victim in the music 
downloading area. Indeed, music downloading is non-rivalrous with respect to the computer 
from whom the user is downloading. But what the RIAA convinced people of was that music 
downloading is rivalrous theft with respect to copyright holders and the RIAA. An act of theft, in 
 
14 At this point, a brief primer on online file sharing may be helpful. On Napster and peer-to-peer music 
networks, music is made available by users placing their files in a designated directory—a shared music directory. 
Other computers log onto the network, and when searching for a desired song, can scan that specific directory 
during its query. When the searching computer finds a desired song, it then links to the destination computer and can 
download the song directly off of the other computer. 
 The above structure only works, however, if people are willing to put music into shared directories—if 
Tom downloads music onto his computer, and immediately moves the files into another non-shared directory where 
other computers cannot access them, he undermines the network. Consequently, many peer-to-peer networks search 
for ways to encourage users to share their music: tactics include rating systems based on the number of files shared, 
or offering different levels of accessibility based on the number of files shared. 
 The RIAA recognized that there is therefore a fundamental distinction between uploaders and downloaders: 
without the uploaders, there would be no network. Consequently, instead of targeting their lawsuits towards 
downloaders, it began to target lawsuits more at those who upload, characterizing them as enablers in criminal 
activity. The uploaders are a chokepoint—stop them, and the network fails. 
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this case music downloading, can be simultaneously rivalrous and non-rivalrous, depending on 
the point of view adopted.  
 This notion seems paradoxical at first glance: how can a single action be both non-
rivalrous and rivalrous at the same time? Those descriptions are objective, and should not need to 
take into account other factors like points of view. But it actually makes perfect sense. Compare 
music downloading to stealing an actual compact disk in real space. Tom walks into Tower 
Records and steals a CD. Under elementary economics, Tower has been deprived of a CD, while 
Tom has the CD without having paid for it: it is rivalrous theft with respect to Tower. But 
suppose five minutes after Tom stole the CD, Mary walks into Tower looking for the exact same 
CD. If Mary complains about Tom’s theft because that CD is now out of stock and she has to 
walk down the block to another record store, she has no redress under the law, because Tom’s 
theft with respect to her is non-rivalrous. Even though Tom’s action has indirectly and minimally 
affected her, the theft is still non-rivalrous, as it has not permanently deprived her of anything 
and it has not impaired her interests in any significant way. Tom’s theft is therefore 
simultaneously rivalrous and non-rivalrous, depending on the point of view adopted and who we 
think the victim is. 
 The same is true with respect to music downloading. When Tom downloads music off of 
Frank’s computer, he has not deprived Frank of anything, even though his actions may indirectly 
impact him.15 Tom’s actions, however, are not non-rivalrous to everyone in the universe: the 
 
15 Perhaps the most significant impact his actions may have is reducing Frank’s bandwidth. Bandwidth theft 
is something not explored in this paper that probably should be at some point. Briefly, access to the Internet is 
analogous to access to a highway—there are only a certain number of lanes available for all of the data to traverse to 
get to where they are going. Any action taken over the Internet that involves sending or receiving data—basically 
everything—uses up bandwidth. Some actions take up very little bandwidth—checking e-mail or viewing a 
webpage, for instance. Others, like music downloading can take up a great deal of bandwidth. Assuming Frank pays 
for his Internet access, downloading music off of his computer can actually be rivalrous with respect to him, just not 
in the sense that he is deprived of music in anyway, but that he is deprived of the complete Internet access he 
purchased. 
11
various copyright holders have been deprived of sales proceeds. That deprivation will not change 
with time; once Tom has downloaded the file, he has no need to purchase the music, and the 
copyright holder’s interest is permanently impaired. This harm should not be taken lightly, 
either. The economic effect of Tom’s theft is not just that the record company has lost a sale to 
him, it is that it could not sell a Tom a record even if they wanted to do so at a loss. Aggregated 
over millions of users, this amounted to a great deal of harm during the height of the Napster 
revolution.16 The theft is therefore simultaneously rivalrous and non-rivalrous with respect to 
different groups of people based on the point of view adopted. 
 What the RIAA done has so effectively is convey this message to the general public. The 
RIAA has essentially answered the question posed earlier—who is the victim—with an answer 
that aligns victimhood with the person whose interests are permanently impaired. By 
characterizing music downloading as rivalrous, the RIAA managed to persuade millions of 
people that a victimless crime had a very real victim. 
 
II. Password Theft 
Robert Konop was frustrated with Hawaiian Airlines.17 A pilot for Hawaiian and a 
member of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) union, Konop had been following the most 
recent labor negotiations with great earnest. What he saw upset him a great deal: the ALPA had 
 
16 A study sponsored by the RIAA suggests that music retail sales near college campuses—where the vast 
majority of Napster usage took place, due largely to the accessibility of high-speed Internet access—plummeted 
during the years of Napster, by as much as 88%. REPORT OF MICHAEL FINE,
http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/pdf/napster/fine.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).; see also, Q&A: Music 
Downloading, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/3582621.stm (last visited Aug. 16, 
2005). 
 
17 The following fact pattern is based on Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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agreed to almost all of the concessions suggested by Hawaiian management. If this were the 
1950’s, or even the 1980’s, Konop would have no redress other than through democratic means: 
organize elections to replace union leadership, or perhaps call meetings and the press to put 
pressure on the ALPA to fight Hawaiian management. But this was 1995, and Konop decided to 
employ a different tack to get other union members to see his point of view: he started a website. 
 Konop’s website was no ordinary website that average Internet users visit everyday. 
Recognizing the sensitive nature of his website’s content—he could lose his job over this, after 
all—Konop restricted access to his website. Prior to being able to view any of the website’s 
content, a potential user had to log on by entering his name; that name had to be on a list of 
Hawaiian pilots and employees composed by Konop. Once the user was logged in, the user 
created a password that would allow the user to return to the website. Thus, Konop was able to 
ensure that the only people viewing his website were fellow employees that he selected; no one 
from the ALPA’s current leadership, no unwanted lawyers, and certainly no one from Hawaiian 
management. In addition, one of the terms for viewing the website prohibited approved users 
from disclosing the contents of the website to others. Konop, as webmaster, had designed a space 
where he, and others who shared his views, could freely express their displeasure with Hawaiian 
Airlines and their union leadership without fear of retaliation. 
 James Davis was a Hawaiian Airlines vice president when Robert Konop set up his 
website, and, having learned of its existence, he wanted to see its contents for himself. However, 
because of Konop’s design features, Davis could not do so without literally hacking the site. 
Instead he did something quite obvious, and quite devious—he used someone else’s name. Using 
the names of two other pilots who were on Konop’s approved list—after having procured their 
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permission—Davis was able to gain access to Konop’s site and view its contents for himself.18 
He relayed what he found to Hawaiian Airlines president Bruce Nobles, who contacted the 
ALPA leadership personally to discuss the matter.19 
Konop, after having been contacted by the ALPA leadership and temporarily taking his 
website offline, refused to relent and continued to operate his website as before. His records 
indicated that over the next four months, Davis logged onto his website at least 34 times as one 
of the two pilots whose names he was using. Eventually, Konop was placed on medical 
suspension. As a result, Konop sued, alleging state tort claims, violation of the federal Wiretap 
Act, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Railway Labor Act. The district court 
granted summary judgment claim on all but one claim, and entered judgment against Konop on 
the last one after a short bench trial. Konop appealed to the Ninth Circuit. With the exception of 
one claim, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 
 Robert Konop’s story is an interesting starting point for a discussion of password theft 
because it presents some of the major problems facing law enforcement and courts in defining 
theft in the digital age. Specifically, the Konop story raises two problems that arise in most 
password theft cases: identifying the victim and evaluating how the victim was harmed. 
 The victim in this case was obviously Robert Konop. But, as I argue below, when taken 
out of the context of personal websites and employment retaliation, that question becomes harder 
to answer initially. Finding the victim in these cases is incredibly important if the law is to 
effectively deter password theft.  James Davis harmed Konop by using two passwords that had 
 
18 As I argue below, that James Davis was able to procure the pilots’ permission should not matter, as in 
this case, the pilots had no permission to give. See infra, pg. 25.  
 




been lent to him without Konop’s permission to log onto his website. In a sense, Davis defrauded 
the computer—he convinced it that “he” was “someone else”; this is classic fraud in the 
inducement.20 Identifying who owns the password becomes critical in answering the first 
question: who is the victim. As for the second issue, the harm suffered by Robert Konop was 
very real: he could have lost his job. He may have been placed on medical suspension as a result 
of this website, which certainly cost him money. More fundamentally, his privacy was invaded. 
The harm caused by password theft very often impairs a pecuniary or a dignity right. 
 What we have here, then, is a criminal act: a perpetrator defrauded the victim’s computer 
and impaired the victim’s dignity. Password theft, however, is not a unary crime; it comes in two 
forms, depending on the nature of the password. The discussion that follows details first and 
second-party password theft.21 The distinction between the two rests on who holds the password 
when it is stolen—the person to whom it belongs (the first party), or the person to whom it is 
entrusted (the second party). First-party password theft concerns crimes that are quite familiar—
identity theft, monetary theft, mail theft—and are clearly analogous to the common law crime of 
larceny. Indeed the jurisprudence that has arisen around first-party password theft has followed 
that course, and has had relatively little difficulty in adapting to the Internet. 
 Second-party password theft, however, concerns crimes that are not as obvious—
unauthorized access, password sharing, and the like. Two recent famous examples of second-
party password theft both coincidentally involve university admission offices at prestigious 
universities. At Princeton University, an admissions officer hacked into Yale University’s 
 
20 See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse 
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1596, 1654-55 (2003). 
 
21 There is a third form of password theft that is a hybrid of the first two that is not discussed in this paper. 
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website to gather personal information about applicants to the Ivy League school.22 Similarly, a 
group of Harvard University Business School applicants hacked the Harvard site to learn if they 
had been admitted or not.23 In the Princeton case, the admissions officer guessed the access 
codes based on the applicants’ applications to Princeton; while the officer certainly invaded the 
privacy of those students, his actions also calls into play criminal liability with respect to Yale.24 
His action was a textbook case of second-party password theft. In the Harvard case, a hacker 
posted instructions on his website on how to hack Harvard’s website. While Harvard tentatively 
has stated that those known to have hacked the website will be denied admission, the school has 
run into a familiar problem in these kinds of cases: not knowing who committed the crime makes 
it difficult to apply an appropriate punishment.25 
Second-party password theft also calls into play the notions of rivalrous and non-
rivalrous theft raised by the RIAA in the Napster case.26 In addition, courts have completely 
missed second-party password theft’s closest real space analogue: embezzlement. If courts are 
going to effectively criminalize second-party password theft, and if law enforcement is going to 
effectively deter it, they need to identify these two characteristics. 
 
A. First-Party Password Theft 
 
22 CNN.com, Princeton Accused of Ivy League Hacking (2002), 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/25/yale.princeton (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
 
23 Robert Weisman, Harvard Rejects  119 Accused of Hacking: Applicants’ Behavior Unethical at Best,
BOSTON GLOBE (2005), 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2005/03/08/harvard_rejects_119_accused_of_hacking_1110274403. 
 
24 Indeed Yale considered pressing charges against Princeton, although it never did. 
 
25 See infra, note 23. 
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 First-party password theft involves the theft of a user’s password that results in damage to 
that individual. The harm that results from first-party password theft usually takes on one or both 
of the following characteristics: (1) the loss of a pecuniary interest; or (2) the deprivation of a 
dignity or privacy interest. Additionally, another underlying characteristic of all first-party 
password theft cases is that ownership and possession of the password are located in the same 
person: the person from whom it has been stolen.  
 Password theft causes pecuniary harm in rather obvious ways. Just as stealing the key to 
my safety deposit box is a form of theft, stealing my personal identification number to access my 
online checking account can be viewed as a form of theft aimed at accessing the contents of that 
account. Law enforcement and courts have recognized this, and have acted accordingly.27 The 
use of a computer is merely a different instrumentality for the same underlying illicit purpose: 
acquiring someone else’s property. 
 In the case of harm to a dignity or privacy interest, the harm is characterized as an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy. Stealing Tom’s password to read his private e-mail is no 
different than opening his real space mail. Both involve invading his privacy and harming either 
or both of his dignity and privacy. Even though his e-mail may reside on a third party’s server, 
he clearly has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to its contents, and the law should 
punish unwanted intrusions.28 
In both of these cases the harm is directly inflicted on the party who owns the password. 
 
26 See infra, pgs. 7-11. 
 
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2004) (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). See also United States v. Petersen, 98 
F.3d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant violated Computer Fraud and Abuse Act when he hacked into 
the computer of a financial company and illegally transferred funds into his own personal account. 
 
28 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1211 (C.D. Cal. 2004); United 
States v. Sims, No. CR 00-193 MV, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25819 (D.N.M. 2001). 
 
17
When Frank signs up for a checking account with Citibank or for e-mail with America Online, a 
password is given to him by the service provider so that he can access something—in this case 
his money or his correspondence—that belongs to him. When a criminal steals Frank’s 
password, therefore, he takes something that belongs to Frank; the act contains clear real space 
analogues to common law larceny. Larceny, according to William LaFave, consists of  a 
trespassory taking of the personal property of another.29 In the case of first-party password theft, 
because the user actually owns the password, when it is taken by the thief, the thief’s action 
constitutes a prima facie case of larceny.  
 The existence of real space analogues has allowed law enforcement to easily adapt 
larceny to an Internet-based environment in shaping preferences and characterizing first party 
password theft as criminal.30 A perfect example of the law’s proper adaptation of common law 
larceny to first-party password theft is Oregon v. Schwartz.31 In Schwartz, the defendant used a 
program to guess the access password to some of the plaintiff’s computer systems. The 
defendant proceeded to store the information he found on his home computer.32 The court, in 
upholding the defendant’s conviction for violating Oregon’s theft statute, recognized that first-
party passwords have intrinsic value: “passwords have value only so long as no one else knows 
what they are. Once defendant had copied them, the passwords were useless for their only 
purpose, protecting access to information in the [plaintiff’s] computers. The loss of exclusive 
 
29 See LaFave, supra note 10, at §19.2. 
 
30 Compare Mesh v. Elenbogen Safe Deposit Co., 220 Ill. App. 351, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1920) (allowing a 
third party to access the plaintiff’s safety deposit box amounts to larceny) with Oregon v. Schwartz, 21 P.3d 1128, 
1135 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that access passwords to defendant’s computer systems had independent value, 
and the defendant’s unauthorized use constituted theft). 
 
31 21 P.3d at 1135. 
 
32 Id. at 1130. 
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possession of the passwords...is sufficient to constitute theft.”33 While the court used the 
language of “exclusive possession,” this amounts to possession and ownership residing in the 
same entity. The unauthorized use of such a password, the court recognized, amounts to digital 
larceny. First-party password theft has easily been criminalized on the Internet, because of the 
clear analogy to larceny. 
 
B. Second-Party Password Theft 
 
Second-party password theft is distinguished from first-party password theft by the fact 
that ownership and possession of the password reside in two different individuals or entities. The 
law has had a hard time identifying criminal behavior in this area, because (1) identifying the 
victim has proven elusive; and (2) quantifying the harm that the victim suffered has proven 
problematic.34 The key to answering the second question, however, is correctly answering the 
first one. Because the law has had a difficult time identifying the victim, it has taken an overly 
broad view of damages in second-party password theft in an attempt to deter what it instinctively 
recognizes as criminal.35 This section argues that by effectively identifying who the victim of 
second-party password theft is, and analogizing that action to embezzlement, judges can more 
effectively evaluate the harm suffered by second-party password theft victims. 
 
33 Id. at 1136-7. 
 
34 See Kerr, supra note 20, at 1598-1600, 1611. Kerr argues that a distinction should be drawn between 
unauthorized access in excess of contract-based restrictions on access and hacking to circumvent code-based 
restrictions on access. The result of this distinction, he argues, would allow courts to deal with cases involving 
Internet theft more predictably. While I disagree with his proposal—that the former should be governed by civil 
liability and the latter by criminal liability—his observation that courts have simply looked to harm suffered to find 
criminal liability is profound and informs much of the analysis that follows, especially in Part II.B.2. Part of the 




1. Identifying the Victim in Second-Party Password Theft
The distinguishing feature of second-party password theft is that ownership of the 
password and possession of the password reside in two different entities. This feature of second-
party passwords obscures the victim of the theft, making criminal liability difficult to apply. 
Additionally, the real space analogues to second-party password theft are not as apparent as the 
analogy between first-party password theft and larceny. This has rendered the legal analysis of 
second-party password theft unpredictable, and law enforcement has found it difficult to deter 
second-party password theft.  
 But it should not be so difficult, if instead of following possession of the password, courts 
followed ownership of the password in attaching criminal liability. In doing so, courts could 
follow the lead that has been established telephone fraud cases involving charges of possession 
of stolen property.36 In People v. Johnson, the New York Criminal Court provided an important 
insight in this area: that the medium in which access codes (like computer passwords) are stored 
is irrelevant in a stolen property analysis, since what matters is that the access numbers were 
used by an unauthorized user.37 In Johnson, the defendant illegally obtained international calling 
card numbers from an AT&T database and tried to sell them to passersby on the New York City 
subway system.38 The defendant showed the number scrawled on a scrap of paper to an 
 
35 Cf. Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to 
Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 355 (2004). 
 
36 See Pennsylvania v. Delapaz, 796 A.2d 364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); People v. Johson, 560 N.Y.S.2d 238 
(Crim. Ct. 1990). 
 
37 Johnson, 560 N.Y.S.2d, at 243-244. 
 
38 Id. at 240. 
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informant, tore the scrap up, and only then dialed the number, showing that it worked.39 The 
court, in upholding the possession of stolen property conviction, held that it did not matter that 
the defendant had torn up the scrap of paper prior to dialing the number, arguing that “[t]he 
number itself is what is crucial, and not who has the superior possessory interest in the paper on 
which the number is recorded, or whether the number is written as opposed to being 
memorized.”40 In other words, Johnson was in possession of a password that belonged to AT&T: 
ownership and possession resided in two different individuals, and the court followed ownership 
to find criminal liability. 
 In the Internet realm, the analysis of second-party password theft should follow a similar 
path, although the real space analogue to second-party password theft is slightly different. 
Consider a scenario familiar to most law students: LexisNexis assigns a password to Tom for his 
use. Just because LexisNexis assigns Tom a password, it does not mean that Tom owns it: he 
merely possesses it to access their databases. His usage is contingent on certain contractual 
obligations to which he agrees, one of which is that he agrees not to give the password to anyone 
else. Therefore, Tom’s giving it to a friend to use, innocent though it may be with respect to 
Tom, is actually a form of conversion, or embezzlement.41 The purveyor of the password can 
justify his act just like the Napster user can—the user’s use has not harmed anyone. Additionally, 
the user was unlikely to pay for the service, just as the Napster user, in the service’s absence, was 
 
39 Id.
40 Id. at 243.  
 
41 But see Kerr, supra note 20. Kerr argues that this action should be governed by civil liability, rather than 
criminal liability. I respectfully disagree with his position. Kerr rests his argument on the assumption that finding 
criminal liability in this case would criminalize behavior that millions of Internet users engage in everyday. But the 
same was true of music downloading, and modest gains have been made in that area by characterizing that activity 
as criminal. In addition, the goal of criminal law should be to deter future criminal behavior, not to rationalize away 
past criminal behavior. 
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unable to buy the music. Using embezzlement as a real space analogue to second-party password 
theft provides the most fruitful way for law enforcement and courts to effectively characterize it 
as criminal.42 
Second-party password theft is characterized by a party giving a password to another 
entrusted user for that user’s benefit. In the language of embezzlement, lending an entrusted 
password to an unauthorized user is a “fraudulent conversion.”43 In real space embezzlement, 
courts have construed this element broadly to encompass a wide range of fraudulent activities.44 
One court in New Mexico, for instance, has characterized fraudulent conversion as “when a 
person having possession of another’s property treats the property as his own, whether he uses it, 
sells it, or discards it, he is using the property for his own purpose…the gravaman of conversion 
is interfering with the rights of the owner, either to the property itself or to the benefit from the 
manner in which the property was supposed to have been used. The details of the interference are 
less important than the interference itself.”45 Lending a password that has been entrusted 
probably falls into this category as well. A password that has been entrusted to a user who then 
lends it to another is an interference with the owner’s rights of distribution amounting to a 
conversion. Identifying the victim in second-party password theft should follow the same 
 
42 See LaFave, supra note 10, at §19.6. According to LaFave, embezzlement evolved because the law 
recognized that requiring a trespassory taking for larceny created a massive loophole in the age of corporate agents: 
agents, who had rights to use corporate assets, would use them for their own personal benefits, at the expense of the 
corporation. Because they had access to these assets, their actions could not be characterized as trespassory, a crucial 
element in a larceny claim. Embezzlement was created to fill that hole. Rather than require a trespassory taking, 
legislatures required a fraudulent conversion of the property of another. 
 
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., New Mexico v. Archie, 943 P.2d 537, 540 (N.M. 1997) (holding that a convict who took off an 
electronic monitoring bracelet and threw it away was guilty of embezzlement, because ownership of the bracelet 
resided with the state, and he was merely entrusted with its use.). 
 
45 Id. [interior quotations omitted] 
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analytic framework that has been in place for decades in embezzlement cases. The owner, not the 
possessor, of the password is the real victim. 
 By using a clear real space analogue, like embezzlement, the law can effectively 
characterize second-party password theft as a criminal action. What remains, however, is 
evaluating the harm that the victim suffered. This stage of the analysis relies upon the distinction 
between rivalrous and non-rivalrous theft presented above.46 
2. Evaluating Harm in Second-Party Password Theft
Once the victim of second-party password theft has been identified, the next step is 
evaluating the harm the victim suffered. It is in this area that the law has failed most 
dramatically, largely due to its misunderstanding of the first issue. In determining liability—
criminal or civil—courts have paid overdue attention to the damages portion of the analysis.47 
The analytic approach that courts have adopted has lacked both analytic rigor and any semblance 
of consistency. As Orin Kerr has rightly pointed out, a finding of harm by a court has become a 
substitute for a finding of liability.48 
Congress’s incursions into this area have not faired much better. Under the federal 
CFAA, to be liable for password theft—or any form of computer abuse—the damage caused by 
the criminal must exceed $5,000.49 Consistent with their generalized approach, this provision has 
 
46 See supra, pgs. 7-11. 
 
47 See Kerr, supra note 20, at pg. 1611. 
 
48 Id.
49 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8)(A) (2000). 
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been interpreted broadly by many courts.50 The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act has codified 
this approach, allowing just about any action a victim takes in response to an unauthorized access 
to be used in calculating damages.51 This approach has come under attack from a variety of 
sources.52 Indeed, as Galbraith points out, the breadth of the PATRIOT Act’s scope potentially 
includes a variety of actions taken by victims that would never be considered damages in real 
space, and opens the door to grave abuses by victims.53 Some of the actions considered 
“damages” by the PATRIOT Act would be ludicrous in real space. If a thief approached Tom’s 
home, tried the door knob, and simply walked away, the thief could probably be convicted of 
attempted burglary. If, after learning of the thief’s attempt, Tom then installed an expensive 
alarm system and a brand new deadbolt lock system, could he charge the thief for those 
expenses? Of course not: Tom benefits from the enhanced security, regardless of the last thief’s 
actions. Yet under the PATRIOT Act, the Internet equivalent of installing a deadbolt in response 
to an attempted burglary—installing a firewall in response to an attempted hack—contributes to 
the damages analysis of criminal liability. The damage portions of the PATRIOT Act allow for 
all sorts of inefficiencies in victim behavior. 
 By properly identifying the victim and the perpetrator of password theft, however, the 
law need not evaluate the specific damages actually suffered by the victim and it does not need 
 
50 See EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584-585 (1st Cir. 2001); Shurgard Storage 
Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that damage 
to the integrity of a network that causes the victim to take corrective measures can go towards the damage 
calculation under the CFAA). 
 
51 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 814, 114 Stat. 272, 382 (2001).  
 
52 See Galbraith, supra note 35, at pgs. 354-55; see also Kerr, supra note 20, at pg. 1611.  
 
53 Galbraith, at 356 (“[W]ebsite owners…can ensure that they have fulfilled the $5000 statutory threshold. 




an arbitrary threshold of $5,000. For instance, in the LexisNexis example presented above,54 the 
proper victim is LexisNexis, and the perpetrators are Mary (the password holder) and Tom (the 
password borrower) in the case where Mary lends her password to Tom, and the perpetrator is 
just Tom if he steals it from Mary. The harm of Tom’s theft can be grave when replicated on a 
mass scale, and impossible to quantify. The result of stealing Mary’s password is not just that 
Lexis lost a sale; it is that it could now never sell an account to Tom, even for a penny.  If Tom’s 
actions are allowed to continue unchecked, aggregating over thousands of transactions, it can 
amount to extraordinary damage to Lexis. If Lexis installed a comprehensive firewall after 
Tom’s password usage, therefore, they still benefit from it on a much greater scale, regardless of 
Tom’s behavior; there is no reason to include it in a damages calculation if the sole perpetrator is 
Tom (or perpetrators are Mary), especially since that single transaction is trivial in comparison to 
the real damage suffered by Lexis. Finding liability, therefore, should not hinge on crossing an 
arbitrary threshold that is impossible to quantify accurately: it should hinge on whether an action 
permanently deprived an owner of his ownership rights. Put simply, if a user embezzles a 
password, he has committed theft.55 
Conducting the analysis in this fashion also dovetails nicely with the dual rivalrous and 
non-rivalrous nature of Internet theft. If Tom steals Mary’s Lexis password, we have seen that by 
following ownership instead of possession, Tom is really stealing from LexisNexis, not Mary. 
And economically this should be so. Tom’s theft is rivalrous with respect to LexisNexis; they are 
permanently deprived of the account they could otherwise have sold to Tom, and far more in the 
aggregate. On the other hand, Tom’s theft is non-rivalrous with respect to Mary; his theft, 
 
54 See supra, pg. 18.  
 
55 To avoid economic substitution effects, the law could easily stratify the penalties of password theft based 
on the severity of the theft. 
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whether with her permission or without, has deprived her of nothing. At worst, she may have to 
be reassigned a new password, or be deprived of access to Lexis for a limited time. But the 
depletion is not permanent, and should therefore not be considered theft with respect to her.56 
Second-party password theft analysis would also deal with the Konop case far more 
effectively than the Ninth Circuit did.57 Robert Konop was clearly the victim in the case, as it 
was his password to distribute, and his harm was real, even if the pecuniary nature of that harm 
was de minimis. Where the court erred, however, was in mistaking possession of the password 
for ownership. Had it not done so, the perpetrators of the crime would have been clear: the pilots. 
James Davis accessed Konop’s website with passwords given to him by two pilots who had no 
right to lend them. By “lending” their passwords to Davis, the pilots embezzled those passwords, 
interfering with Konop’s right to determine ex ante who had access to his website. Once a 
perpetrator is identified, Konop’s harm becomes far more real and easy to evaluate, if difficult to 
quantify precisely—his ownership right was fraudulently converted, and his privacy was 
invaded. 
 
III. How to Deter Password Theft: Following the RIAA’s Lead 
In applying the above theory into practice, Internet content-providers like LexisNexis 
would be wise to follow the RIAA’s lead; after all, they wrote the script. The RIAA’s actions 
after the rise of Napster reflect an understanding of the rivalrous and non-rivalrous nature of 
Internet theft, and a clearer understanding of victim and perpetrator identification. 
 
56 See Kansas v. Allen, 917 P.2d at 853. 
 
57 See supra pgs. 11-13.  
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Comprehensive programs of public education, flexible password usage contracts utilizing price 
discrimination models, and targeted lawsuits are just three examples of tactics that Internet 
content- providers could employ in an effort to reduce password theft. 
 
A. Public Education 
One of the most effective tools deployed by the RIAA in the wake of Napster was an 
aggressive public campaign to brand music downloading as a criminal act. Television and print 
commercials focused on the human side of a multi-billion dollar industry, describing the people 
whose jobs were lost because of illegal music downloading.58 Instead of platinum selling artists 
like Metallica and Britney Spears as the victims, the RIAA used the lesser-known—and more 
modest—employees of music companies who suffer as a result of rampant music downloading. 
The consequence of these advertisements was nothing short of staggering: illegal music 
downloading has plummeted in comparison to the rise of Internet usage since 1999.59 
Internet content-providers should be deploying a similar campaign. While it may be hard 
to garner much sympathy for a faceless corporation like LexisNexis, it is amazing what branding 
something as criminal will do in the court of public opinion. Putting human employees who face 
job loss or pay cuts out front could also enhance the human factor. In any event, Internet content-
 
58 See, e.g., Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegaly Offer Copyrighted Music 
Online (2003), http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/090803.asp (“In addition, it [illegal downloading] threatens the 
jobs of tens of thousands of less celebrated people in the music industry, from engineers and technicians to 
warehouse workers and record store clerks”) (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
 
59 See infra, note 5.  While some polls indicate that the sheer number of people illegally downloading music 
has risen since 1999, that number pales in comparison to the increase in the number of people who have since gained 
Internet access since 2000. According to one poll, that number has doubled in North America alone, and close to 
tripled in other parts of the world. Internet Usage Statistics – The Big Picture,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
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providers should band together to campaign against password theft; because so few people 
consider second-party password theft a crime, they can only improve. 
 
B. Flexible Password Usage Contracts and Price Discrimination 
One reason illegal music downloading has plummeted is the rise of legal, better, 
alternatives that harnessed a changing music listening environment.60 In particular, iTunes, the 
legalization of Napster, and various other outlets, have provided a legal source for music lovers 
looking for music files who did not want to purchase full albums. The upshot of these services is 
that they are simply better than their illegal counterparts. Because the music was countenanced 
by the RIAA, there was less of a chance of acquiring a spoofed song or contracting a virus. In 
addition, because these services actually had contracts with record companies, finding obscure 
songs became far easier on iTunes than on an illegal peer-to-peer network like Grokster. The 
RIAA essentially bit the bullet in approving of iTunes; they make less per song then they did 
when they only sold full albums, but by recognizing a new pattern of music listening, and 
harnessing the technology that enabled it, it has turned rampant theft that did not benefit them at 
all into a profit making arm of the music industry. 
 Better technology will obviously solve a lot of problems for Internet content-providers 
plagued by password theft. Biometric analysis, for example, can identify whether the person 
typing in a password is the actual person to whom that password is assigned. But what iTunes 
and other music downloading services represent in the music world is a recognition that a new 
form of music usage gained traction among listeners. People were tired of the album format, and 
 
60 See Study: Legal Music Downloading Triples Worldwide, supra, note 4. 
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wanted to be able to listen to individual songs on demand. At first, the only outlet for that desire 
was illegal services; but the RIAA adapted, and it has begun to co-opt the medium for itself.  
 Internet businesses should recognize that a new pattern is emerging in password usage. 
People increasingly feel that they own the passwords that are assigned to them as part of a 
service for which they pay, and feel that lending the password to a friend is a right that attaches 
to possessing the password. Internet content-providers have unwittingly fostered this belief by 
allowing users to pick their own passwords in most cases; users will typically pick the same 
password for everything, regardless of whether they own the password or have merely been 
entrusted with its use. Assigning passwords randomly is a small step that sends the signal that the 
password belongs to the service, not the user. Establishing defined, recognizable territorial limits 
can force people to treat assigned passwords differently much in the same way that clear 
territorial lines in real space architecture can encourage respect for property ownership.61 
Rather than stifling password lending, Internet businesses should harness its potential. 
Businesses should offer flexible password plans—by paying more (but less than the amount for 
the full service), users can assign their passwords to a certain number of their friends. This kind 
of arrangement benefits everyone: users can lend passwords under the color of legality, and can 
do so without paying the regular full fee. Internet businesses can cut down on password theft, 
while bringing new customers into the fold. By recognizing a new form of consumer usage, this 
business model mirrors the iTunes model that has arisen in music downloading, which has 
already proven successful. 
 An additional benefit this model offers is the ability to price discriminate between single-
 
61 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 2261 (2002) (arguing that in real 
space, one way the law can effectively deter criminal conduct is by establishing clear, physical boundaries between 
public and private space). 
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use users and other, higher valuation, users. 62 Price discrimination occurs when a seller can offer 
different prices for essentially the same good to multiple classes of individuals, based on their 
preferences. The classic example of price discrimination is the declining price for seeing the 
same movie.63 Movie producers take advantage of the fact that certain individuals are impatient 
and want to see movies as soon as they are released; concordantly, opening day ticket prices for 
movies are incredibly high. However, as time passes, the price of the exact same movie declines 
as the potential pool of consumers grows: first it is offered for rental or sale at a video store, then 
it appears on premium cable channels, and eventually, it is available for free on network 
television. Impatient moviegoers are “high valuation” consumers: they value the product higher 
than most others do, are impatient and will pay more to see a movie earlier, and movie 
production companies are able to trade on that preference by charging them higher prices. 
 As Michael Meurer points out, three conditions are necessary for effective price 
discrimination: “(1) the seller has market power; (2) the seller can link prices to individual 
customer preferences; and (3) customers cannot arbitrage away price differentials.”64 By offering 
different usage contracts, content-providers can easily identify high valuation users. Content-
providers can offer transferable licenses before making content available to the general public, 
for example: they offer the license at a higher price, and, after a set period of time, users are 
allowed to transfer that license to a limited number of friends at a discount to those friends. 
Higher valuation consumers are likely to purchase these transferable licenses as soon as they are 
made available, and lower valuation users, who otherwise may simply steal or borrow the 
 
62 Cf. Michael Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 84-85 (2001). 
 
63 Id. at 85-86. 
 
64 Id. at 59. 
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password from a high valuation friend, are able to buy it instead at a discount. Either way, 
content-providers are able to price discriminate effectively while reducing password theft at the 
same time. The concern over arbitrage can be dealt with effectively by building into the 
architecture of the content restrictions on dissemination.65 In any event, flexible usage contracts 
can not only deal with some of the problems with password theft, but, with effective price 
discrimination, may even become a profitable business venture for content-providers. 
 
C. Targeted Lawsuits 
Lastly, the RIAA has been incredibly successful in deterring illegal music downloading 
by attacking downloaders themselves, rather than the peer-to-peer network providers. The reason 
this tactic has been so successful is that by suing downloaders, it made a costless activity very 
expensive. As Gary Becker has shown, the rate of detection and the severity of punishment are 
largely interchangeable variables.66 Prior to the lawsuits initiated by the RIAA, the chance of 
getting caught downloading music was zero, and the penalty was also zero. When the RIAA 
starting suing downloaders, the chance of getting caught was still incredibly small—millions of 
people were downloading at the time, and Internet Service Providers were loathe to distribute 
their names—but the severity of the penalty had suddenly skyrocketed, especially compared to 
the cost of just purchasing the album legally. Illegal downloading dropped immediately. 
 A similar strategy may be successful for other Internet businesses. It should be said that 
 
65 This is obviously easier to achieve in software sales than on the Internet. Microsoft, for example, sells a 
corporate version of its Office suite at a higher price that allows multiple installations, while its home version of 
Office, while cheaper, only allows for a far more limited number of installations. This feature is built into the code 
of the software. For a discussion on building restrictions into digital architecture as a tool for law enforcement, see 
Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 113 Yale L.J. 2261 (2003). 
 
66 See Becker, supra note 2. 
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the potential for backlash here is tremendous: over-deterrence can create massive marginal 
deterrence problems, as people figure that if they are going to lend a password to one friend, they 
may as well start a website and distribute them to millions. In addition, the court of public 
opinion should not be underestimated either: if the strategy is to educate people, content-
providers should not be too aggressive in prosecuting people who are probably truly ignorant of 
their criminal behavior. Targeting lawsuits against particularly egregious violators—those who 
knowingly distribute passwords on a mass scale, for instance—provides a measure of deterrence 




Fortunately, the law has a path to follow in deterring password theft. The RIAA has 
recognized the threat posed by Internet theft and has made some significant advances in deterring 
it. While they have sustained a great deal of criticism from certain quarters,67 they have also been 
impressively effective, as the percentage of illegal downloaders has dropped since Napster. The 
law, as well as Internet content-providers, can draw some important lessons from the RIAA 
about the economics of digital theft in its efforts to deter password theft. 
 By most measures, incidence of password theft is rising, not declining.68 As more people 
gain access to the Internet, and the Internet’s reach broadens, the importance of passwords in the 
daily lives of the hundreds of millions of Internet users is also likely to increase. While 
 
67 See, e.g. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Frontier Foundation’s defense of Grokster against 
the RIAA, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
 
68 Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft,
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudy/background.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
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technological advances are being made in increasing the security of databases, the law has 
lagged behind in identifying the key features of password theft, and what makes it unique among 
other Internet crimes. Distinguishing between first and second-party password theft, identifying 
the victim, and properly evaluating the harm suffered are just the first steps in updating the law 
to fit the realities of the Internet.  
